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Abstract
The commercial-off-the-shelf small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) market is
expanding rapidly in response to interest from hobbyists, commercial businesses, and
military operators. The core commercial mission set directly relates to many current
military requirements and strategies, with a priority on short range, low cost, real
time aerial imaging, and limited modular payloads. These small vehicles present
small radar cross sections, low heat signatures, and carry a variety of sensors and
payloads. As with many new technologies, security seems secondary to the goal of
reaching the market as soon as innovation is viable. Research indicates a growth in
exploits and vulnerabilities applicable to small UAV systems, from individual UAV
guidance and autopilot controls to the mobile ground station devices that may be as
simple as a cellphone application controlling several aircraft. Even if developers strive
to improve the security of small UAVs, consumers are left without meaningful insight
into the hardware and software protections installed when buying these systems.
To date, there is no marketed or accredited risk index for small UAVs. Building
from similar domains of aircraft operation, information technologies, cyber-physical
systems, and cyber insurance, a cyber risk assessment methodology tailored for small
UAVs is proposed and presented in this research. Through case studies of popular
models and tailored mission-environment scenarios, the assessment is shown to meet
the three objectives of ease-of-use, breadth, and readability. By allowing a cyber
risk assessment at or before acquisition, organizations and individuals will be able to
accurately compare and choose the best aircraft for their mission.
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CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT AND SCORING MODEL
FOR SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
I. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
The desire of man to fly is almost as old as time itself. Since the dawn of flight,
aircraft have evolved to meet new demands and innovations, through the 20th century
and into the 21st. While UAVs have been around since the earliest days of aircraft,
technology in the last two decades has allowed an explosion of options that allow
for militaries and commercial organizations alike to consider the aerial automation of
missions like never before. In particular, small UAVs provide a lower cost of entry
and less overhead, with much of the same aerial advantages as larger vehicles.
As with all computer devices, small UAVs come with risks associated with their
missions, both physical and cyber related. The physical risks of collisions and damage
to structures or people is reflected in United States (U.S.) government regulations and
licensing through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [5]. In contrast, the
cyber risks accepted by organizations and individuals has received very little attention
and oversight by regulators. Most organizations do incorporate some sort of cyber
risk framework to manage risks, but these frameworks are reliant on lackluster risk
assessments for small UAVs.
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1.2 Problem Statement
In some sense, manufacturers currently control small UAVs cyber security stan-
dards by setting their own levels of protection, which may not be acceptable with
consumers. Organizations have little measurement or insight into the risks accepted
with purchasing and operating these vehicles as there is no formal method of compar-
ison, as may be seen with other vehicle safety [6]. Additionally, while manufacturers
may have a vested interest in protecting their devices from outside compromise, the
cost of cyber security efforts and overhead of components and software compete with
financial and physical constraints.
1.3 Research Objectives
This research defines a new cyber risk assessment for small UAVs using the lessons
learned from assessments in related systems. This research then tests and analyzes
this new scoring system by presenting case studies that represent the breadth of
models and mission scenarios for small UAVs. The research objectives of this work
are outlined below:
• Assess whether any cyber or physical risk assessments of similar domains accu-
rately quantify the cyber risk of small UAVs.
• Determine the success criteria a small UAV cyber risk assessment should meet,
based on similar domain assessments.
• Define a new small UAV cyber risk assessment tool (assuming none exists).
• Establish the objectives a hardware-in-the-loop simulation of a small UAV
should meet to best bring awareness to potential vulnerabilities.
2
1.4 Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this research is that no cyber risk assessment tool currently
exists and no similar domain assessment accurately portrays the risk of small UAVs
to its operators/owners. If none exist, a new tool will need to be built using the
lessons learned and scoring models of similar domains that have seen success.
1.5 Approach
The approach consists of first analyzing and comparing many of the similar do-
mains’ risk assessments for applicability to small UAVs and defining the best set of
objectives for a new risk assessment based on the unique characteristics. Utilizing
the closest risk assessment to the required need, a new cyber risk assessment specific
to small UAVs will be defined with as little deviance from the scoring model as pos-
sible to maximize the value of the chosen tool’s lessons learned. The new tool will
then be analyzed against a multitude of case studies to verify its ability to easily and
accurately quantify associated risk of the vehicles to mission scenarios. Lastly, from
the analysis of the case studies, a proposal for objectives that a hardware-in-the-loop
simulation for small UAVs must meet will be presented.
1.6 Assumptions and Limitations
The analysis of similar domains’ risk assessments assumes that all practical as-
sessments have been discovered. It is expected that there are many risk assessments
of use to this research that are not public domain or unclassified that may relate
to this research. This research also assumes that all publicly available specifications
and configurations of utilized small UAVs (under 55 pounds per FAA regulations) are
correct as this research does not personally verify any of this data. This research is
3
limited to risk assessments for only small UAV platforms due to the unique character-
istics, though there may be benefits or applicability of the new tool to larger UAVs.
Analysis is limited to only case studies with no simulations or operational testing,
which meets the goal to move the risk assessment forward in the life-cycle process.
1.7 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis to the field of small UAVs are outlined below:
• Risk Assessment Gap: Discovered a gap in cyber security of small UAVs for
a cyber risk assessment.
• Quantitative Cyber Risk Assessment Tool: A three phase quantitative
assessment of small UAVs from 14 sub-metrics that rate the qualitative security
of the vehicle.
• Quantitative Analysis: Analysis of the granularity of the scoring tool for
breadth and spacing of possible scores.
• Qualitative Analysis: Demonstrated the risk assessment’s ease of use and
accuracy through use of publicly available source materials without operational
testing.
• Simulation Objectives: Defined objectives for hardware-in-the-loop simula-
tion of small UAVs with the goal of better defining the risk associated with use
of the vehicles.
1.8 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
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Chapter II introduces UAV technology and architecture, with corresponding re-
search into security and vulnerability. This is followed by introducing risk frameworks
and assessments across the life-cycle of a vehicle. It also presents ongoing related work
and identifies areas requiring further research.
Chapter III presents a new quantitative cyber risk assessment specifically tailored
to small UAVs. The framework is defined in three sequential phases of Base, Tempo-
ral, and Environmental factors relating to the associated risk of the UAV. Definitions
and limits of each of the 14 sub-metrics are then provided to allow quick and easy
categorization. Each sub-metric can take on one of several discrete levels. The nu-
merical values assigned to each level per sub-metric form the input to the associated
algorithms to produce a final overall risk score.
Chapter IV lists the case study scenarios’ assumptions, control factors, and vari-
ables. A description of the methodology for conducting a risk assessment is also
presented in this chapter. The results, analysis, and observations of the experimental
activities are then expanded on from the case studies. Analysis of the case studies fo-
cuses on the statistical significance of the risk scores along with a qualitative analysis
of its accuracy. Finally, it discusses benefits, drawbacks and challenges, and security
and privacy concerns with the implementation presented.
Finally, Chapter V concludes with a summary of the work presented and the
contributions to the field. In addition, recommendations for those utilizing similar
tools or frameworks are presented. Future work areas for this research involve further
analysis of the risk assessment through historical and / or operational data, correlation
to hardware-in-the-loop simulation of small UAVs, and refinement of the algorithms
and numerical values to better represent small UAVs.
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II. Background and Related Work
2.1 Overview
UAV technology has progressed in parallel with manned aircraft, though their
missions and characteristics differ. In the same vein, many UAV vulnerabilities are
similar to computer system vulnerabilities, though there are significant differences
between the two that warrant separate vulnerability and risk assessment. Chapter 2
discusses the history of small UAVs with emphasis on generalized architecture of the
platforms. This is followed by discussion of current research on UAV vulnerabilities
grouped by category. Lastly, some background on risk and cyber risk frameworks
shows potential for adoption as a UAV cyber risk assessment.
2.2 Brief UAV History
UAVs have been historically built for military applications and continued by hob-
byist enthusiasm. By definition, UAV includes any device that can sustain flight
autonomously, with similar sub-cultures of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and
drones [7]. UAVs are able to either maintain a hover or move completely via com-
puter navigation, whereas RPVs require control instructions throughout flight and
drones have even more limited mission and sophistication. In use, the terminology
between the three vehicle types is flexible, and a risk assessment for a UAV could
cover all of them. William Eddy used cameras attached to lighter-than-air frames
during the Spanish-American War for the first use of a drone in combat [7]. As UAV
operations and innovations continued through the Vietnam War, Desert Storm, and
especially the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the size, mission, and shape of UAVs
have morphed in a utilitarian manner to match the needs of the military. Within
the last decade, civilian enthusiasts have had increasing access to personal airframes
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mainly for photography and video capture.
The exact definitions between sizing tiers have not been standardized between
countries, though practically they consist in some format of very small, small, medium,
and large. An example grouping from the Department of Defense (DoD) is shown
in Figure 1. Very small UAVs exist at a miniaturization of aerodynamics that result
in very low Reynolds numbers and are usually less than 20 inches in any dimension.
Small UAVs tend to be a range of popular model aircraft used by hobbyists and have
at least one dimension greater than 20 inches. While their range may be short, their
size and mobility allows for access not normally available to individuals. Medium and
Large UAVs are too large for an individual to carry and may even use full runways like
light aircraft, which allows for heavier payloads and greater mission duration. Small
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (sUAVs) fly by the same aerodynamics as manned aircraft
using lift and drag, plus control for pitch, roll, and yaw. Their internal architecture
however differs greatly by removing the human pilot from the vehicle. Instead of a
pilot, sUAVs are controlled by varying degrees of autonomy of their autopilot.
2.3 Generalized UAV Architecture
UAVs take a multitude of forms and designs based on mission and user base, from
hand-held copters to jet-powered aircraft. Small UAVs follow the general compo-
nent break out shown in Figure 2, with six common components on the device and a
ground station of some sort. The Basic System is a generalized term for the Operat-
ing System (OS), which is usually proprietary to the manufacturer and tailored per
vehicle, frequently providing near real time control. Modern UAV designs typically
combine the Basic System with the autopilot controller, but they are split here to be
more general. Communication Links in Commercial Off The Shelfs (COTSs) UAVs
are most commonly wireless Radio Frequency (RF) in the public access Industrial,
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Figure 1. DOD Unmanned Systems Categories [1].
Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands of 2.4 and 5.8 GHz, the LTE bands, and 915 MHz
(433 MHz outside the U.S.). Sensors refer to components that are attached to either
aid navigation of the system, such as LIDAR to monitor nearby structures, or for
specific mission purposes. Avionics consume sensor input, such as Global Positioning
System (GPS) and inertial modules, and provide flight control. For the payload, a
weapon component has been seen within military operations, though the vast major-
ity of sUAVs are used for military or hobbyist reconnaissance with only an additional
sensor component such as a camera. As defined for UAV, some form of autonomous
control is built into the vehicle’s navigation, so the autopilot component is separated
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from the Basic System.
UAV
Basic System
Communication 
Links
Sensors
Avionics
Payload
Autopilot
Ground Control 
Station
Application
Communication 
Links
Figure 2. Components of Typical UAV.
The ground station can be decomposed into the Application component and Com-
munication links, though these are typically contained within the same device such
as a tablet, phone, or laptop. The complexity and portability of ground stations
vary widely from simple RF remote controls to multi-server backends. Examples of
these differences can be seen in the common Chinese DJI Sciences and Technolo-
gies Limited (DJI) brand, which utilizes both manufacture specific hardware and a
smartphone application. The software is extremely portable through mainstream app
stores and can be updated over reliable connections. The hardware connects to the
user’s smartphone to provide controls to the sUAV with separate antennas and power
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supply for better coverage. The application can also be used without the hardware
through a laptop to program mission states via cable. Some DJI models even allow
simple remote controls or beacons without application software, though their mission
sets are more rudimentary. Each of these configurations introduce risk characteristics
by connecting the device to the greater world differently.
The sUAV Command and Control (C2) architecture may be centralized with a
remote operator, or decentralized, as in the case of a group of cooperating sUAVs
[8]. With the wide spread of designs, the architectures are best understood on a
continuum between the two extremes of fully autonomous systems to completely
centralized drones that require all C2 input from a user. By the definition, complete
centralization would have almost no autopilot features as all command and control
would come from the ground station or other entity. At the other end of the spectrum,
the boundary is being pushed experimentally for Artificial Intelligence (AI)-controlled
swarm UAVs where each unit communicates with other agents, but controls itself to
collectively meet the group’s mission. The norm for COTS sUAVs, however, is human
control (at the supervisory level) with autopilot for structural avoidance and fail-safes
[9]. It is common for systems to change C2 structure between missions or even on
the fly depending on available components and mission need.
There are different paradigms for the amount of C2 inputs to the system to ensure
mission success, known as Command, Request, or Exception [10]. The Command
paradigm means that the UAV only operates from user commands. The Request
paradigm means that users send commands only as requests for the system to accept
or deny. Exception paradigm means that commands are sent rarely to change autopi-
lot decisions. A particular system may change paradigms mid-mission based on its
rule set and the occurrence of events. The different paradigms lead to differing risk
in relation to control hijacking.
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2.4 UAV Cyber Incidents and Research
Publicly released cyber incidents with and against UAVs have been limited, with
the most well-known consisting of the Iranian incident in December 2011 [11]. While
confirmation of the exact means of Iranian capture is speculatory [11], the incident
highlights the vulnerability of UAVs in a combat zone and the need for cybersecu-
rity in future UAV models to maintain control for mission success. One model for
categorizing threats to computer devices was developed by Microsoft and follows the
STRIDE acronym [12]. These threats were then correlated to properties of computer
security [13], shown in Table 1.
Table 1. STRIDE Model and Related Properties.
Threat Property
Spoofing Authentication
Tampering Integrity
Repudiation Non-Repudiation
Information Disclosure Confidentiality
Denial of Service Availability
Escalation of Privilege Authorization
Vulnerability of UAVs has been better defined with the multitude of research being
conducted as the cost of systems has dropped, especially for small UAVs. Following
the STRIDE model for UAVs, each threat has been studied by the research community
at length and a quick summary using the model is provided here.
2.4.1 Spoofing
Instead of blocking signals being utilized by the UAV, one method of attack that
has been widely documented by research is breaking the integrity of the navigation
signal, with the most common being GPS [14]. GPS works by having the satellite con-
stellation broadcast GPS messages toward Earth, which allows a device to triangulate
its own three dimensional location on Earth. The signals, coming from satellites, can
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be overridden fairly easily in localized areas, especially by military forces wishing to
deny adversaries, as shown in Figure 3. By sending false GPS signals, an adversary
can cause UAVs to falsely identify their current location and, as seen in the Iranian
incident, be led to a specific location or forced to crash. GPS signals are also used for
timing on systems, especially Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
devices far from other sources. GPS spoofing has been shown in timing attacks to
be able to change phase settings on high-voltage power lines [15] and cause Denial of
Service (DoS) through communication protocols [16]. Navigational security can be
gained either by duplicate sensors tracking out of band of each other or by Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) that track received inputs and decide if a GPS attack is
occurring, though the latter lacks the innate ability to recover current or projected
location or timing.
2.4.2 Tampering
The corruption of integrity of signals in and out of a UAV is categorized under
Tampering. The signal in question can be data or control signals, though the physical
and digital evidence is significantly different [17]. Figure 4 details a control and data
signal tampering situation since the attacker has not removed the remote control
laptop of the victim from the network. Control tampering is usually simpler in terms
of variance of timing since the UAV is somewhat autonomous depending on control
architecture; however, a near complete Command architecture requires quick and
efficient changes to prevent simple DoS of the device through high latency of C2. High
latency in returning data feeds may also serve as evidence of tampering occurring to
the victim, though simpler data such as location may show less latency as the change
requires less byte manipulation [18]. The result of tampering may be a forced crash
or loss of control, or may be as slight and unnoticeable as simulated locations or new
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Figure 3. GPS Spoofing on a UAV.
control settings.
2.4.3 Repudiation
Non-Repudiation is when the “sender is provided with proof of delivery and the
recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s identity so that neither can later deny
having processed the data” [19]. From this, the threat of repudiation is any allowed
denial by either party; Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) compromises are an example
of this threat [20]. Commonly joined with other STRIDE threats, repudiation threats
represent a legal risk to any organization or user online [12]. UAVs are particularly
threatened by repudiation threats since many small UAVs do not use a PKI protocol
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Figure 4. Tampering via Man in the Middle Attack.
and use less secure methods for validating messages. For those UAVs that do properly
implement PKI, a compromise of a Certificate Authority (CA) can allow for false
positive validation of messages between an attacker and either a ground station or
UAV, as seen in Figure 5 [21]. The implicit trust of physical components within a
vehicle has less viability over the last decade, though most wireless protocols have
some form of identification using a Media Access Control (MAC) or Internet Protocol
(IP) address. Remote Control (RC) signals or physically installed Secure Digital (SD)
card or Universal Serial Bus (USB) are examples of implicit physical trust giving an
attacker an access vector, which may be a threat to the proper user [12].
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Figure 5. Repudiation Threat through Compromise of Certificate Authority.
2.4.4 Information Disclosure
From the confidentiality aspect of security, the data signal and control signal can
be targeted for simple sniffing of the wireless communication, as graphically shown
in Figure 6. For simplicity and reduced latency, some sUAV communications tend to
operate un-encrypted allowing for easy sniffing of all traffic [22]. If the control stream
is captured, the navigational commands are known to the adversary along with the
UAVs current and projected location, as well as any transmitted information about
the payload. If the data stream is compromised, whatever the device is streaming back
to the controller can be captured, which may include sensitive video/audio streams
or other sensor data. While usually more of a concern for sensitive government or
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military missions, civilians should also be concerned about the risk to their personal
information and devices caused by these signals being broadcast in the open [22].
The vulnerability of data leakage depends on the size of fingerprint, degree of signal
obscurity, and location. The fingerprint size will vary widely based on the wattage of
the transmitter sending the signal and the network’s coverage, especially with swarm
or ad hoc UAV networks [8]. While most COTS sUAVs operate on the ISM Wi-
Fi bands and 915 / 433 MHz, it is possible for UAVs to use any radio medium to
transmit; the probability of finding and listening over those channels changes over
time. The location of the network in relation to potential listeners also varies across
the globe from urban locations to remote deserts, though these distant locations may
include expert or known adversarial forces with motive to attempt eavesdropping.
2.4.5 Denial of Service
The easiest and most common vulnerability of sUAVs is DoS attacks [18] by either
Electronic Warfare (EW) or accidental electromagnetic interference [17], as shown in
Figure 7. Since sUAVs almost exclusively communicate over wireless channels, their
shared command and data lines are by definition vulnerable, though the extent is
defined by power of signal and amount of signal reuse. For COTS UAVs specifically,
command and data is sent over the Wi-Fi bands and 915 / 433 MHz, which is well
utilized within urban environments, though a small amount of sUAVs operate over
the less power demanding Bluetooth protocol at 2.45GHz. Conflict of signals may
lead to slower data transmission rates, corruption of data, or even loss of signal [18].
The Message Drop Rate (MDR) statistic is used to define the weakness of the signal,
agnostic to the exact factor causing the loss, whether internal, external, or malicious
[17]. As seen in the Iranian incident, UAVs respond differently to loss of command
signal, with common methods being hovering, immediate controlled landing, or return
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Figure 6. Collection of Un-encrypted Traffic between UAV and Ground Station.
to a home location or last known good signal. If just degraded, the observable physical
indicators may be limited to either halting or delay in response time [18].
2.4.6 Elevation of Privilege
Similar in compromising integrity of signals, the control signal has been shown by
researchers to be vulnerable to hijacking in UAVs. Similar to Figure 4, the control
signal operates by a variety of protocols to stream commands to the device and
can be hijacked if another entity is able to convince the device that they are the
valid ground station, usually by elevation of privilege from a valid signal. This is
different from just a Man in the Middle (MitM) attack where the integrity of the
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Small UAV
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Figure 7. Denial of Service on UAV.
traffic is compromised; elevation of privilege takes primary control of the vehicle
away from the original user. Common network attacks that have been shown to work
also on UAV networks includes MitM and de-auth/authentication attacks [23]. By
convincing the device of a new controller, the device can be sent any valid command
and is totally compromised. Also available to adversaries is the tactic of sending bad
commands to create fatal errors in the Real Time Operating System (RTOS) and
thus system failure, resulting in a crash or failsafe controls such as returning to the
home waypoint [22]. More sophisticated attacks are possible through misdirection or
deception against the original user for other effects. For example, an attacker can
mimic the original user’s commands in most cases, but make the user think that the
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vehicle is broken to cause loss of confidence in the vehicle or to accelerate replacement,
similar to the Stuxnet virus [24].
2.5 Current UAV Frameworks and Index
The field of risk management with UAVs is a multi-dimensional issue. As cyber-
physical devices, the risk in question depends on the viewer’s perspective. Risk is first
defined, then risk in the specific context of UAVs is studied in greater detail moving
from higher level operational risk to determining risk prior to purchase. With each
step, the pros and cons of determining risk at that level is discussed for determining
the most beneficial point to complete, and therefore design, a cyber risk assessment.
2.5.1 General Risk
Quantitative risk assessments are not unique to computers and have existed within
the field of commerce (e.g. insurance and investments). The most generalized de-
scription of risk is well-known as the product of Cost and Likelihood. Cost is the loss
or recovering price tag in the event of a failure. Likelihood is the probability of failure
over time or the rate of failure in a specific time frame. Note that the existence of
a theoretical failure event does not necessarily result in a risk. For example, if the
event were impossible, or if a failure state had no associated cost, there would be no
risk. Figure 8 depicts a larger general quantitative assessment process where R(min),
R(max) define risk limits, L(max) defines one-time loss limit, and C is the budget [2].
The process shown in Figure 8 takes into account the four options of risk treatment
that are available to organizations, which are as follows: Avoidance, Acceptance,
Reduction, and Transference [2]. Avoidance is the worst case treatment where the
cost has surpassed the max loss value and the probability of compromise is reaching
one. Acceptance is the opposite treatment where cost and probability are at levels
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Figure 8. Risk Management Process.
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that meet risk management goals. Reduction is the treatment option when the risk
level is within requirements, but not below minimum risk (where default treatment
is to make no further changes). The last treatment option is Transfer, where the
risk is within requirements, but the recovering cost is too much and insurance should
be considered. Figure 9 then shows a general view of how best to determine which
option to take based on probability of loss (row), loss value (L), and acceptable risk
amount (R) which will vary between organizations and over time.
Figure 9. Risk Treatment [2]
A risk framework is the process of defining a policy for managing risks such that
strategies employed lead to acceptable risk states [25]. There is no one framework
that could be applied to every industry due to different weighting of risk states and
definitions of failure. Common frameworks include Risk Management Framework
(RMF) as used by the DoD, Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) built for critical infras-
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tructure, Information Security Maturity Model (ISMM) and Control Objectives for
Information and related Technology (COBIT) [26].
Risk assessments are a sub-set of risk frameworks and attempt to define the risk
associated with an individual system versus presenting a process for managing this
risk over the long term [25]. Traditional networked computers have been formally
assessed as early as 2000 with the first quantitative assessment, Information Security
Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM) [26]. The largest separation between risk frameworks
and risk assessments is the lack of strategy after defining risk of a device or system,
other than an implicit directive to reduce risk. A categorization of risk into tiers is
not a risk framework either as it lacks definition into acceptable risk levels and course
of action due to the categorization.
All UAV security improvements created due to the vulnerabilities discussed above
have been baked-in to new models by manufactures at their discretion for their profit,
with very few software patches. Traditional risk frameworks for managing these vul-
nerabilities disregard UAVs as outside the scope of the Information Technology (IT)
networks due to complexity. While UAVs do tend to never connect to organizational
networks, the physical proximity, increasing connectivity of devices, and the surge of
mission uses will not allow the next generation of frameworks to opt-out of managing
the risk intrinsic to all devices with remote capabilities. While many risk frameworks
exist for organizations based on size, sophistication, and security, the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST) created RMF is the standard adopted
by the U.S. DoD for mission assurance and provides flexibility for variations in sys-
tems [26]; however, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that UAVs,
encompassed in Internet of Things (IOT) devices, were not managed by the risk
frameworks in practice [26]. Risk frameworks and assessments from pure operational
to near-pure UAV assessment will now be discussed to show current research into or
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around UAV risk assessments.
2.5.2 Operational Risk Assessment
The research arm of the FAA for the incorporation of small UAVs into the National
Airspace System (NAS) is National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
[27]. Due to various commercial ventures requesting access, NASA started develop-
ment of the UAV Traffic Management (UTM) system in 2014 with the publication
of their 15 year plan, with a planned five years until initial deployment [28]. The
patent for the UTM was published in 2016 with the addition of classes of airspace
based on location, vehicle and population density, and environmental hazards [5].
The basis of connection to this new UTM would include the use of approximately
ten new communication protocols as standard on all UAVs, which would each re-
ceive flight plan constraints for the individual UAV autopilot to navigate around in
real-time called the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Traffic Management Risk Assessment
Framework (URAF), following the logical process shown in Figure 10 [5]. NASA
has continued development of the UTM with three studies completed in 2017. The
first was a prototype testing of the communication and software systems, plus the
first publishing of the philosophies and principles of designed URAF [27]. Across six
different FAA UAV test sites, 17 unique aerial vehicles, and 60 additional simulated
vehicles, the UTM successfully commanded 102 flights simultaneously with a reported
vehicle non-conforming rate of 32.5% [27]. These non-conforming flights represented
risk of mid-air collision or collision with building or person that was calculated to be
above the nominal risk level.
NASA’s URAF Philosophies:
1. Flexibility whenever possible, Structure when necessary
2. Risk-based airspace requirements
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NASA’s URAF Principles:
1. All UAS, operators, and communications are authenticated before use of the
airspace.
2. UAS will avoid each other and other objects.
3. UAS will stay separated from manned aviation.
4. All of the constraints, including dynamic constraints for public safety opera-
tions, are available to all stakeholders for common situational awareness.
5. Access will be fair and efficient.
The risk calculation software of the URAF was simultaneously being developed by
the next two publications. The first of these analyzed the complexity and accuracy
differences between standard and probabilistic risk models to be used in the UTM
[29]. With the determination that Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) models would be
best able to keep real-time risk estimation, the authors laid out the model for two
failure types (return to base and un-powered descent) using six input sensors [29].
The second research effort built and tested the BBN using Hugin Developer suite
[30]. The BBN was developed for both of these scenarios using the expected inputs of
aircraft down-link, population density, and known environment hazards to calculate
the real-time risk through calculations of the probability of expected failure states
and the pre-determined possible severity [30].
The URAF’s risk modelling software is device agnostic, except for size and weight,
which means that the system in no way quantifies cyber risk threat for these UAVs
though such efforts would cause “off-nominal trajectories” [30] which NASA and the
FAA are attempting to reduce. While regulation of sUAV production to meet the
requirements of communicating with the NAS may coincidentally provide some level of
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Figure 10. UAV Traffic Management (UTM) Control Flow.
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risk reduction for cyber threats, the lack of this goal in their design will mean that this
improved posture will be undocumented and ineffective due to conflicting differences
between operational risk and cyber risk (large UAVs such as those employed by the
military already have to meet aircraft regulations). Traditional aircraft manufacturing
also has no cybersecurity regulations for design and no standard for the amount of
risk that is acceptable for commercial operation [31]. For an example of a potential
cybersecurity regulation introducing operational risk, latency due to encryption on a
communication link may lead to mid-air collision. Protection of UAVs against cyber
threats therefore needs to occur sooner than the operational level and with specific
cyber mindedness.
2.5.3 Network Risk Assessment
Operational risk does not define all of the risk associated with incorporating com-
puters into mission sets today. Cyber attacks and accidents are another aspect of
risk that may be missed by solely viewing physical interactions of systems, as seen
in the FAA’s URAF. When observing operational computer networks directly, cyber
risk tends to be the main focus, as seen next with cyber risk frameworks, insurance
modeling, and critical infrastructure.
Cyber Risk Framework: The lead organization for reducing cyber risk for the
Department of Defence, and setting a popular standard for enterprise and critical
infrastructure risk management, is National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [26]. NIST first published the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) as a tool to
provide a “voluntary risk-based cybersecurity framework to help organizations man-
age cybersecurity risks” [32]. While CSF is designed directly for critical infrastructure
and higher risk systems, a parallel framework was also published for enterprise net-
works as the Risk Management Framework (RMF) directly for the Department of
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Defense [26]. The RMF process is a six step qualitative study and mitigation strat-
egy as shown on Table 11. For devices on the network and their connections, a secure
baseline configuration is built following common secure networking and configuration
techniques. Devices that do not meet the traditional mitigation strategies, for ex-
ample IOT devices, are simply segmented away from the network or expelled [26].
Living document style reporting and individualized baselines do allow for flexibility in
classifying devices, even IOT, which are commonly missed by current scanning tools.
UAVs fall into this hands-off category and a risk scoring system would be a boon to
managing their risk within RMF instead of rejecting.
Insurance Modeling: As a growing variation of quantitative cyber risk, insur-
ance policies have been diverting some of the risk of exploitation since 1997 when
the Internet use globally was only 1.7% of the population [33]. Insurance companies
function on a strategy of taking premiums upfront to cover the risk of failure in the
future and spread out the cost for the user, whether for disaster, health care, or cyber
attack. The Internet has since exploded in size with the total cyber insurance mar-
ket estimated at $3 to 3.5 billion in 2017 [34], with cyber crimes costing the global
economy an estimated $450 billion in 2016 [35]. The companies that issued cyber in-
surance premiums totaling $1.35 billion in 2016 [36] did so based more on an abstract
perception of risk due to a lack of historical data to determine probability and actual
monetary damage for previous attacks, especially when the damage is information
theft or leakage [37]. The most common and simple equation for insurance is based
on historical average of cost per incident times the probability of incident in the near
future [38], which requires the very information that is lacking or obscured for cy-
ber incidents. To reconcile this discrepancy in information, several research models
have been developed to validate insurance investment though fewer have published
methods of quantitative risk indexes. Research suggests that cyber insurance is fea-
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Figure 11. Risk Management Framework [3].
sible and a positive for security, as long as the premiums charged are tied directly to
self-protection strategies employed by the organization [39]. For quantifying this risk
versus protections, the largest issue is not previous historical data which will continue
to grow over time, but mapping all possible attack vectors in the insured system which
requires knowledge of all locations of valuable information and employee accesses and
habits [40].
The most promising method to grasp the state of a computer network from the
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cyber insurance industry is presented by the Cyber Risk Scoring and Mitigation Tool
(CRISM) which operates continuously as a specially designed IDS developed at Old
Dominion University [38]. Based on the recent use of plug-in devices by automobile
insurance companies, CRISM maps out a connected network, uses National Vulnera-
bilities Database (NVD) to determine and prioritize vulnerabilities present, calculate
likelihood of exploitation via BBN, then scores the risk of the network in near real-time
to allow for monitoring, as shown in Figure 12 [38]. First published in 2017, CRISM
is still in development, unlike CSF and RMF which are in wide-spread practice [26].
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Figure 12. Five phases of the CRISM tool.
Critical Infrastructure: Industrial Cyber Physical System (CPS) and SCADA
have been utilized to gradually reduce required human interaction in safety-compromised
work areas and in wide distributed networks. Physical sensors formerly required eyes
to read, determine system state, and adjust actuators to keep processes within safety
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limits and manufacturing effectiveness. As CPS stations are utilitarian and usually
connected to physical sensors for input, protection schemes need to adjust for their
physical process monitoring, closed control loops, attack sophistication, and legacy
technology [41]. Regular IT exploitation follows a typical path that ends at an IT
node with information which is valuable in itself; whereas industrial CPS exploitation
usually requires further exploitation to influence physical processes to either ruin or
shut down systems [42]. Research into adding cybersecurity to CPS systems skyrock-
eted after the discovery of the sophisticated Stuxnet virus in a nuclear plant. The
nuclear plant in question has been studied, with its cybersecurity posture matching
industry standards and much of the IT standards [43]. At the direction of Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS), NIST published the CSF to directly define the
risk framework for critical infrastructure in the U.S. [44]. The core of the framework
is the process of Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover [44]. While the
framework does reduce the footprint and likelihood of attack, there is no assessment
of the risk state of the system nor a method of comparison between systems [45]. Even
within a review of 24 critical infrastructure cyber risk assessments, all lacked either
initial network mapping, historical data driven statistics, or only relied on known
vulnerabilities [46].
Attempting to overcome these current assessments’ shortcomings, Cyber Security
Risk Index (CSRI) is a proposed and beta risk assessment specifically using Bayesian
Networks since systems should be defined through CSF [47]. To cover the cyber-to-
physical risk, the most common technique is to use Markov chains in conjunction
with the Bayesian Networks which allows for distinct states along with probabilities
of events [48]. A major drive to Bayesian networks is the complex states that physical
processes may enter, which differ on Mean Time to Shut Down (MTTSD). While the
probabilities to reach across the IT network to the Programmable Logic Controllers
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Table 2. Cybersecurity Framework Core and Sub-Categories.
Core Phases Sub-Categories
Identify
• Asset Management
• Business Environment
• Governance
• Risk Assessment
• Risk Management Strategy
• Supply Chain Risk Management
Protect
• Identity Management
and Access Control
• Awareness and Training
• Data Security
• Information Protection
Processes and Procedures
• Maintenance
• Protective Technology
Detect
• Anomalies and Events
• Security Continuous Monitoring
• Detection Processes
Respond
• Response Planning
• Communications
• Analysis
• Mitigation
• Improvements
Recovery
• Recovery Planning
• Improvements
• Communications
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(PLCs) follow well-documented methods and means through NVD or Cyber Vulnera-
bility and Scoring System (CVSS), detection, and vectors at the PLCs require expert
weighting and most likely proprietary input [45]. CSRI shows particular promise to
the critical infrastructure field since penetration testing is near impossible and simu-
lations are difficult without the hardware in the loop [47]. Detection before shut down
is limited within industrial CPS to IT IDSs that are built to overcome the unique
aspects within industrial networks [41]. Even with research progressing to better
characterize the risk statically and dynamically present in industrial CPS, there are
no open-source rating systems in circulation, though cybersecurity companies spe-
cializing in control systems are starting to use them to better define current risk and
prioritize defensive actions. While a SCADA risk index has potential for use within
the UAV community, the lack of an operational open-source index, smaller scale of
systems, and the shorter lifespan of systems reduce direct applicability to sUAVs.
2.5.4 Vulnerability Severity Scoring
Today’s most utilized quantitative vulnerability severity assessment tool is CVSS
[49], maintained by Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) Inc. As
an “open framework for communication of the characteristics and severity of software
vulnerabilities” [4], CVSS provides data points to the NVD and Common Vulner-
abilities and Exploitations (CVE) databases, which are from there utilized by risk
frameworks to define vulnerability of networks. The most current version 3.1 calcu-
lates a Base score from 0.0 to 10.0 through eight metrics seen in Table 13. This Base
score is then modified by Temporal and Environmental factors to give the final score
also ranging from 0.0 to 10.0 and is specific for the investigated network or device.
An Extensions Framework optionally allows for the manual adjustment of factors for
specific fields, although there is no published framework for UAVs.
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Figure 13. CVSS v3.1 Metrics [4].
Since risk is most commonly defined as the product of cost and likelihood, CVSS
is designed only to better define the cost variable to a customer [4]. Several proposed
risk frameworks attempt to utilize CVSS directly by setting the likelihood probability
to one for worst case [50], to another constant, or to a value that increases or decreases
over time. In addition to not predicting likelihood, CVSS also does not define devices
and thus does not take into account device mission, which is of critical value to UAVs
[11]. CVSS provides the most robust, widely applied, and therefore useful scoring
system for cyber devices on the market. More discussion on the CVSS framework
and calculations can be found in Chapter 3 as the framework is a basis for the risk
assessment built in this research.
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2.5.5 Pre-operational Risk Assessment
In the attempt to move risk assessments earlier in the life cycle process, there
are several research fields that have researchers working to build risk assessments
meant for acquisition, of which traditional aircraft, healthcare, and a UAV specific
assessment will be discussed.
Traditional Aircraft: With nearly all on-board components being seen on both
traditional aircraft and small UAVs, a cyber risk assessment for aircraft could be
assumed to be the best translation to sUAVs, especially taking into account cyber-
physical aspects that are not seen in other IT fields. Regrettably, the commercial
aircraft industry does not currently have any cyber assessments for risk [31]. While
industry standards for the design of aircraft information systems exist that incorpo-
rate defense in depth (RTCA SC-216 and EUROCAE WG-72), there is no measure of
how well these standards were implemented or any comparison between vehicles, and
no expected updates to either standard through 2021 [31]. The Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) Civil Aerospace Cybersecurity subcommittee identified that each
manufacturer and operator defines their own risk framework and assessment of cyber
risk on their aircraft; therefore, there is no commercial aviation cyber safety Cyber
Action Team (CAT) to set standards and respond to incidents [31]. As one of the
key priorities of the report, the AIA subcommittee published the statement that the
industry needs “a risk managed approach...to architect future secure systems” and
“better global visibility...to address aviation ecosystem threats and risks” [31].
Healthcare: Within the healthcare field, only 61% of organizations are currently
using cyber risk management [51]. Since cyber flaws were only being treated as de-
vice flaws that were corrected through long-term regulations by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), Stine proposed a medical device risk assessment that would
allow for understanding of risk in hospitals, prioritization of devices requiring ad-
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ditional protection, and ease of calculation for the low cyber awareness of general
healthcare practitioners [50]. Stine created a cyber risk scoring system through two
steps: severity of worst case scenario and the amount of security features present.
The worst case scenario was judged on the System Administration, Networking, and
Security (SANS) objectives [52] with five available severity tiers. For each attribute
and tier, Stine manually developed constants that could be summed for the overall
risk of the device, with the highest risk tier being the basis and a 2:1 ratio of equiv-
alency to the next lower tier [50]. Each attribute tier was described in healthcare
laymen terminology of cyber effects and was focused on the worst case scenario of
misdiagnosis or causing human death in another manner. This mission focus cap-
tures the unique characteristics and requirements of healthcare devices versus other
risk frameworks for IT networks. Shown in Table 3, the attributes and tiers are built
with the attacker’s purpose in mind, instead of simple IT sanitation.
Table 3. SANS Objectives.
Action System Component
Loss of:
View
Control
Denial of:
View
Control
Sensors
Manipulation of:
View
Control
Sensors
Safety
The second stage of Stine’s scoring system was the employment of security features
within or connected to the device in question to reduce the previously calculated
step. The security features were designed as a nine question survey which should
all be answerable by a professional or from the specifications guide for the device.
The questions were borrowed from Microsoft’s STRIDE model which was described
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in the first part of this chapter, but also proposed each defensive attribute as one or
two questions to better define characteristics of proper risk management in cyber as
seen in Table 4 [50]. For each positive response to a question, the proportion of that
category is reduced from the appropriated SANS objectives.
Table 4. STRIDE Properties with Defining Security Questions.
Property Security Question
Authentication
Does the system use multi-factor authentication?
Does the system enforce secure credential creation, usage, and main-
tenance principles?
Integrity
Can the system detect and prevent manipulated parameters?
Does the system protect against tampering and reverse engineering?
Were secure software design principles followed during development?
Non-Repudiation Does the system verify and log all user actions with attribution?
Confidentiality
Does the system follow industry standard encryption practices to
secure connections?
Availability
Was the system built and tested for high availability (e.g., fuzz testing
and load testing)?
Authorization Does the system allow for management of all users and privileges?
While Stine met the set goals of Ease of Use, Low Cost, and Understandable
Results [50], the scoring system lacked significant scoring fidelity due to the limited
scored attributes, though this in some part is due to the wide range of healthcare
devices. The use of manually crafted constants to define the risk of an attribute’s
severity to the overall risk of the device also requires significantly more application
to devices to prove the accuracy of use.
Small UAV: Hartmann and Steup’s scoring system shows the current threshold
for a quantifiable cyber risk score, though with significant shortcomings. The authors
define the general internal network of UAVs with the most vulnerable components
as communication links, sensors, data storage, and autopilot configurations [53]. By
defining the hardware and software of each of these components through a survey of
the market, corresponding attributes were defined with the autopilot being simplified
to its fail-safe state and the sensors being increased to four configurations and three
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combinations. The attribute of Environment was also added in with the imperative
that any risk assessment for UAVs must include the risk inherit to the operational
environment and the mission set [53]. Each of these attributes then were judged
according to Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) with a subjective as-
sessment of values from zero to one based on the author’s perceived associated risk
. The summation of these values were then used as the calculated risk of device
with larger values corresponding to more risk. Lacking in categorization of risk and
what values are acceptable, the simple calculation lacked detail describing what the
risk value meant. Though stating that mission sets must be included, the authors
also failed to create any attribute for calculation or factoring. The use of defining
key components through surveying the breadth of common configurations for use in
defining risk is useful due to the lack of databases of known vulnerabilities.
Though there are several risk assessments around the employment of sUAVs, none
mentioned here properly capture the cyber risk of the unique devices to an organiza-
tion’s greater network. While many organizations do employ cyber risk frameworks to
make a concerted decision based on the risk present, the decision is built on little in-
formation if the device is assessed incorrectly or not at all. Operational risk of sUAVs
is important to safety, as tackled in NASA’s UTM; however, the real-time assessment
treats all aircraft as nearly identical except for physics, which is simply incorrect for
cyber threats. Risk assessments from parallel cyber security realms show important
lessons learned and build out valuable objectives for a sUAVs risk assessment. In the
next chapter, a new cyber risk assessment is defined using the foundation of CVSS
and all of the lessons learned from previous attempts.
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III. Risk Scoring System
3.1 Framework Overview
With the growing number of small UAVs being used for private and public mission
sets, a framework is required for determining the differing risks between devices.
This framework identifies component based security weaknesses and merges that with
mission and environment requirements for a quantification of risk. A risk framework
for UAVs must be easily understood by consumers and raters and general enough to
allow for applicability across the rapidly changing designs coming to market.
3.2 Framework
To accomplish the ease of use objective, the CVSS scoring system is foundational
to the design of this framework. CVSS provides common nomenclature for cyber risk
managers currently securing networks and verified quantification constants in their
algorithms proven over years and volume of use. The model of Base metric modified
by Temporal and Environment metrics provides a contemporary risk framework to
ease adoption. As described in Chapter 2, CVSS does not score risk, but severity
of vulnerabilities, so substantive changes are required to shift the focus to device
risk and to adapt to the UAV domain in particular. A simple extensions framework
as provisioned in version 3.1 would not update the original scoring system to rate
any metric outside of severity of vulnerabilities as the extensions framework merely
tweaks constants within the equations. This framework redefines several sub-metrics,
while maintaining as much of the CVSS structure as possible. This should allow
mission owners with limited knowledge of cyber risks to define and rate UAVs for their
organizations, providing insight into the risks of any device considered for acquisition.
The breadth and variability objective of this framework is accomplished also
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through the foundation of CVSS as a 0.0 to 10.0 scoring system with risk categories
from High to Low. The simplicity of the final score allows for quick yet accurate
comparison of potential devices on the market. CVSS reaches this final score through
nuanced math equations that include prioritization of risks, unique modifications, and
breadth of the vulnerabilities. All of this is abstracted to a final score for consumers
without loss of fidelity.
Lastly, general applicability for the breadth of the UAV market looking to the fu-
ture is built in to the framework through the use of abstracted questions with example
configurations. The current market provides a baseline for this scoring framework,
but is not limited by this as new models are developed. It is expected that major
changes to the market in the form of new regulations or sensors may require updates
to this framework, but not at the same rate as new vehicles being released which
would be unmanageable. By providing a volume of grading sub-metrics, new releases
to UAV configurations can be reflected immediately and provide insight to the new
risk accepted by consumers to their missions.
3.2.1 Base Metrics
Attack Vector (AV) is the sub-metric of connection of the device to potential at-
tackers. Similar to IT networked devices, the required logical location of an attacker
directly correlates to the risk of the device being attacked due to the size of the poten-
tial attacker pool and increased automation of scanning and exploiting, as shown in
Table 5. A UAV with Direct connection to the Internet with an IP address is the most
at risk variation as commands could be crafted from anywhere. The more common
case is that the Ground Controller has access to the Internet, whether through cable,
Wi-Fi, or mobile services. This configuration reduces risk by requiring an attacker
to compromise, prior to attacking the device, the ground controller or a third-party
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Figure 14. New Proposed sUAV Risk Assessment Metrics.
server which may be acting as the ground controller through the laptop or phone. Less
risk is assumed if the ground controller or mission data is Air-Gapped from the UAV
through use of a separate memory device or disabling of connections to the ground
controller, which require persistent compromise of the ground controller. Lastly, if no
Internet connection is involved with the UAV at any time, then an attacker must be
physically present to override or block command and data signals. This None value
is most commonly found with cheaper RC variants of UAVs, or those configured for
fully automated missions with no human-in-the-loop.
The second sub-metric of the Base Score is Device Modification (DM), which
analyzes how standard the device is to its brand’s advertising or specifications, and is
shown in Table 6. The most common COTS UAVs purchased have a base-line model
with few (if any) variations, and all of them represent a higher level of risk since the
attacker has less device discovery and more confidence of repeatability between the
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Table 5. Attack Vector Values.
Base Level Description
Direct
The UAV is bound to the network directly and the set of possible
attackers extends to the entire Internet. Such a device is often termed
“remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as being exploitable at
the protocol level one or more network hops away.
Ground
Controller
The UAV is indirectly bound to the entire Internet through the
ground controller. An attacker may utilize persistent or live exploita-
tion to the ground controller for persistent or live exploitation of the
UAV.
Air-Gapped
The UAV is not bound to the network and the attacker’s path is via
persistent read/write/execute capabilities on the ground controller.
Either the attacker exploits the vulnerability by accessing the ground
controller while not connected to the UAV or the attacker relies on
persistent code to modify commands live to the UAV.
None
An attack requires the attacker to be physically present to manipu-
late the vulnerable component. Physical interaction may be brief or
persistent.
same models. The other extreme is a complete Do-It-Yourself (DIY) UAV that has no
standard configuration and is close to being unique. The DIY UAV will most likely
utilize standard protocols and hardware, but risk has been lessened by the increase in
discovery and decrease in repeatability available to an attacker. If a standard UAV
has one or more custom modifications, including payload(s), then the device may
be labelled as having a High Device Modification as the attacker can not assume
standard interactions.
Table 6. Device Modification Values.
Base Level Description
Low
Specialized modifications or extenuating circumstances do not exist.
An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vul-
nerable UAV.
High
The UAV has one or more custom modifications or extenuating cir-
cumstances. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at
will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount
of effort in preparation or execution against the unique vulnerable
UAV before a successful attack can be expected.
Privileges Required (PR) is the sub-metric that defines the software design of com-
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ponents implementing appropriate privilege delineation, as shown in Table 7. Unlike
common IT networks, UAVs typically have the assumption that the connected user,
whether physically or wirelessly, is the administrative user with the only other priv-
ilege level being a kernel variety that is used by the OS. Authentication for commu-
nication and commands, and authentication prior to access at rest show High levels
of separation.As an example of Low value, the wireless protocol of a UAV requires
some authentication such as through 802.11 and only flight logs are stored openly
via physical memory card then the default Low value is appropriate. If the commu-
nication protocols allow any signal received to be executed or valuable flight data
and commands are accessible physically by any user with a cable, then the level of
privileges required is None.
Table 7. Privileges Required Values.
Base Level Description
None
The attacker does not require authentication prior to attack, and
therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vul-
nerable system to carry out an attack.
Low
The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities
that could normally affect only settings and files available to any
connection physical or logical. Alternatively, an attacker with Low
privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.
High
The attacker requires privileges that provide significant control over
the vulnerable UAV allowing access to device-wide settings and files.
The next sub-metric of the Base Score is Scope (S), which is an evaluation of
risk associated with an attack on the device spreading to other devices. While many
UAVs are operated within a one user / one device schema, ad hoc networking and
swarm technologies are gaining viability, with the risk levels shown in Table 8. The
addition of trust of connected agents to a targeted UAV increases the risk of associa-
tion with compromised agents and increases the likelihood of an attack on the device
in question, similar to IT networks. The connection can vary from command signals
to simple navigational directions, but a single vulnerable device has the potential to
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wreck others in the network or compromise a mission. The NAS is not included in
this sub-metric’s assessment as the NAS includes calculations from internal sensors
and every other vehicle in the airspace for validation, though its risk does also in-
crease with compromised integrity. If the system in question is networked with other
UAV systems, then the Scope is rated Changed. Otherwise, the sub-metric is rated
Unchanged.
Table 8. Scope Values.
Base Level Description
Unchanged
An exploited UAV can only affect resources local to that device or
ground controller. In this case, the vulnerable device and the im-
pacted device are the same.
Changed
An exploited UAV can affect other devices beyond the local scope.
In this case, the vulnerable device and the impacted device may be
different as the vulnerable device can impact others.
The next sub-metric of the Base Score is User Interaction (UI), which is the
evaluation of the risk associated with not including a human in the loop, with the
risk levels shown in Table 9. As explained previously, architectures range from fully
autonomous, to supervisory, to full control. When a UAV has complete control of its
flight, assuming some preset mission parameters, the user does not have the ability to
override incorrect decisions made by the system. This autonomy may be a necessity
arising from communication restrictions such as distance or a design feature to fire
and forget. With any amount of user interaction, errors or compromises to the mission
may be counter-acted, such as GPS spoofing being counter-acted with new way points
or direct first-person control. If an attacker is able to make changes to the system
without authorized user interaction, then the sub-metric is rated None. A system
that is programmed in such a way that requires human-in-the-loop would be rated as
Required interaction.
The next three sub-metrics of the Base Score are related to the impact of an
attack on the device. The first is the Confidentiality Impact (C), which analyzes
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Table 9. User Interaction Values.
Base Level Description
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any
user.
Required
The system requires authorized user interaction for system or mission
changes. Attacker must social engineer their attack for the authorized
user to accept.
the securities in place on the device to lessen the threat of a confidentiality breach.
Confidentiality is the security objective of restricting access to information at appro-
priate pre-determined levels. Security activities enforcing this include encryption of
data at rest and Over-The-Air (OTA), as explained in Table 10. “Encryption of data
storage” assumes authorization protocols are in place to access data logs, mission
data, and user settings, each of which may contain sensitive information. OTA en-
cryption, which may be enforced by the wireless protocols utilized or manually with
in-house encryption, ensures that sensitive data in transit between device and ground
controller is not eavesdropped on or collected. Not all data on or transiting a UAV
may be considered sensitive information by the user, and as such lower coverage or
levels of encryption may be considered sufficient security with lower associated risk.
Table 10. Confidentiality Impact Values.
Base Level Description
None
There is no confidentiality security in place, resulting in all resources
within or transmitting from the impacted UAV being divulged to
an attacker. Alternatively, there is no security protection of some
specific restricted information, and this sensitive information presents
a direct, serious impact to the user.
Low
There is some confidentiality security in place. Access to some re-
stricted information is not secured, but the amount or kind of loss is
limited. The information unsecured does not cause a direct, serious
loss to the user.
High
There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted UAV or in its
communications due to proper security in place.
The next impact sub-metric is Integrity Impact (I), which analyzes the securities
in place on the device and on its communication links to enforce integrity, as shown
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in Table 11. Integrity is the security objective of verifying that information present is
the correct or intended information, and the information has not been tampered with
by an attacker. These securities usually are included based on the type of protocols
used for communication with check sums, cryptography methods, or through self-
diagnostics.
Table 11. Integrity Impact Values.
Base Level Description
None
There are no protections of integrity in place on the UAV. The at-
tacker is able to modify any/all files without detection. Alternatively,
only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would
present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Low
There are some protections in place, but modification of data is pos-
sible. However, attacker does not have control over the consequence
of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data
modification does not have direct, serious impact on the impacted
component.
High
There is no loss of integrity within the impacted UAV or in its com-
munication links.
The last sub-metric of the Base Score is Availability Impact (A), and the levels
are shown in Table 12. Availability Impact analyzes the level of security allowing
for continued availability of communication links, whether from an attack or from
non-malicious electromagnetic interference. Availability is most commonly secured
through multi-channel communication and is important for both the command and
data signals. Multi-channel communication may be built into a wireless protocol or
be present via hardware in multi-protocol communications. If the redundant channels
are only minor (such as changing Wi-Fi channels) or require a hard switch (such as
turning off the current channel and switching to another wireless medium), then the
security level is shown as the Low level as availability was lost briefly or had increased
probability of control or reception being regained.
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Table 12. Availability Impact Values.
Base Level Description
None
There is no availability security, resulting in the attacker being able to
fully deny access to resources of the impacted UAV; this loss is either
sustained or persistent. Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to
deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct,
serious consequence to the impacted UAV.
Low
There are some protections to availability in place, or the protections
are not persistent. The resources in the impacted UAV are either par-
tially available all the time, or fully available only some of the time,
but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted
component.
High
There is no impact to availability within the impacted UAV’s com-
munication links or there is no threat to availability. For example,
a pre-programmed UAV which only collects information locally may
be considered fully available as no signals are present to be lost, as
long as the device continues operation.
3.2.2 Temporal Metrics
A significant aspect of cyber risk is its ability to change over time. The temporal
sub-metrics each represent aspects of the risk of the device that are evaluated at
certain instant in time that is also understood to change after a period of time. From
an attacker’s perspective, time is of the essence and having exploits and tools available
prior to targeting greatly decrease the time and cost of carrying out an attack.
The first sub-metric of the Temporal Score is Market (M), which is an assessment
of how common the device is around the world and potentially how valuable the UAV
is to attackers. Taking directly into account an attacker’s motivation, risk is increased
if the reward to effort ratio is greater, as shown in Table 13. This metric is constantly
changing as the market evolves due to country relations, large organizations make
trade deals, and new regulations impact the viability or marketability of UAVs. The
market share of each brand and model are normally published at least annually, if not
a quarterly basis, especially if the company is publicly traded. For value of an UAV,
the principal players of the UAV industry include, but are not limited to, first-world
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military inventories, distribution companies, and other large companies that may use
UAVs to provide services.
Table 13. Market Values.
Temporal Level Description
High
50% or more of the market share is held by the UAV brand or the
UAV is used by more than one major customer. The device then is
expected to hold significant value in the eyes of an attacker.
Medium
More than 25% but less 50% of the market share is owned by the
UAV brand or the UAV is used by exactly one major customer. The
device then is expected to hold some value in the eyes of an attacker.
Low
Less than 25% of the market share is held by the UAV brand and the
UAV is not used by any major customer. The device then is expected
to hold low value in the eyes of an attacker.
None
The UAV is either non-standard or homemade, and therefore holds
near 0% of the market share. The device then is expected to hold
almost no value in the eyes of an attacker.
The next sub-metric of the Temporal Score is Vendor Support (VS) which evalu-
ates the rate or quality of updating a UAV’s software and defined in Table 14. Often
termed “hotfixes” or “patches”, the vendors of computer products still within mar-
ketability will release updates in code in response to uncovered vulnerabilities or new
features. While UAV vendors release significantly less patches than the IT sector due
to the lifespan of device marketability, cyber risk is significantly reduced when time,
money, and people are invested to secure current released software. Vendors are not
the only party interested in securing software, but the user or research communities
often step up to release optional patches when vendors refuse and there is user inter-
est. This metric intrinsically decreases over time as use and interest fade with the
release of new models with better features.
The third and last Temporal Score sub-metric is Lifespan (L) which is the evalu-
ation of the expected time remaining of service. Risk is increased when more time is
available for the device to be discovered and attacked, as shown in Table 15. While
individuals or smaller organizations may not have concrete decisions in place at ac-
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Table 14. Vendor Support Values.
Temporal Level Description
Unavailable
There is no vendor support and no active community support for the
UAV. The device is no longer sold new by the vendor and vendor
will not provide support for current inventories. An in-house build,
though still supported by staff, would still be categorized as no vendor
support due to level of support and increased risk.
Low
There is no official vendor support, but there is active community
support providing updates or workarounds to vulnerabilities. The
device is most likely no longer being sold new by the vendor, though
some support may be provided by exception or contract.
Medium
There is occasional official vendor support and there is active com-
munity support for the UAV. The device is most likely still being
sold new by the vendor, though at least one newer, similar model is
marketed by the same vendor.
High
There is active official vendor support and active community support
for the UAV. The device is most likely the premier model marketed
by the vendor.
quisition, most large organizations determine a life-cycle management plan for new
assets where some defined mission life is expected. Different than normal IT equip-
ment in some ways, the life expectancy of a small UAV is most likely less than the
planned life-cycle for an organization, so when new models will be purchased needs
to be taken into account.
Table 15. Lifespan Values.
Temporal Level Description
High
The expected lifespan of the UAV for missions is greater than the
expected support of the device by the vendor or greater than 2 years.
Normal
The expected lifespan of the UAV for missions is within the expected
support of the device or between 1 and 2 years as a normal lifespan.
Low
The expected lifespan of the UAV is less than 1 year and is expected
to be discontinued from missions soon.
3.2.3 Environment Metrics
Vital to any UAV risk assessment, mission risk is rated within the Environment
metric modifier. The mission requirements are similar to the original CVSS definition
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due to the whole device or system being rated for mission requirements, instead of an
individual vulnerability. The whole device, here the UAV platform, may be designed
for multiple mission sets and therefore must be rated for the highest requirement in
each sub-metric. The mission metric is divided into Confidentiality Requirements
(CR), Integrity Requirements (IR), and Availability Requirements (AR), following
the basic definition for cyber security. Each sub-metric is rated one of three possible
levels which are defined in Table 16 and are as follows: High, Medium, Low. Unlike
CVSS which includes a Not Defined level, this framework requires a determination
of mission requirements with Medium level being the default by having a neutral
modifying effect on the Base metric.
Table 16. Environment Sub-Metric Values.
Requirement
Level
Description
High
Loss of [Confidentiality — Integrity — Availability] is likely
to have a catastrophic adverse effect on the organization
or the mission.
Medium
Loss of [Confidentiality — Integrity — Availability] is likely
to have a serious adverse effect on the organization or the
mission.
Low
Loss of [Confidentiality — Integrity — Availability] is likely
to have a limited adverse effect on the organization or the
mission.
Included within the Environmental Score of CVSS is the Modified Base Scores,
which are duplicates of the Base Score sub-metric that are adjusted for the specific
situation of the device in question. CVSS Base Score sub-metrics are supposed to be
analyzed network and mission agnostic for the vulnerability in question such that the
metrics would then be static for any customer using a device that would be vulnerable.
Only the Modified Base Score would be updated for a new customer to reduce du-
plicate effort. This assessment analyzes each device with its prospective mission and
environment in the Base Score, such that no new information would be gleaned in the
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Modified Base Score. For UAVs specifically, the mission and environment are neces-
sary to risk assessments [11] and are not viable without them. Removing the Modified
Base Score sub-metrics from the scoring system is simple as the CVSS default is to
use the original Base Score sub-metrics. In the future, should a risk assessment of
an UAV be beneficial separate from mission and environment, this assessment can
be simply reverted by re-adding the Modified Base Score sub-metrics in the Environ-
mental equations instead of the Base sub-metrics. The Modified sub-metrics are the
same levels and definitions, instead modified for an organization’s specific use.
3.3 Scoring System
The risk scoring system is designed to take each of the metrics defined in Section
3.2 and to calculate an overall risk score. For ease of use, the score is limited to
values between 0.0 and 10.0 in increments of tenths, which directly corresponds to
101 possible risk states. The values of sub-metrics are derived from the open-source
values of CVSS, which is to leverage the long-term value of testing and refining that
CVSS placed into their vulnerability severity assessment. Due to the design of each of
this framework’s sub-metrics in line with CVSS’s sub-metrics, the values of severity
should be close and directly related to values of risk. The equations are borrowed from
CVSS due to the direct connection between their assessment and this assessment.
3.3.1 Base Score
The Base Score is calculated first using the first eight sub-metrics that all revolve
around device design and securities. This score is not necessarily accurate for any
future assessment or for a different customer since the use cases, configurations, and
payloads are considered. Each of the sub-metrics in the Base Score have a constant
value assigned based on the value determined, as shown in Table 17. Each sub-metric
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is seen to be ranked from value correlated to highest risk to lowest risk, though each
sub-metric is not valued completely equal.
Table 17. Base Sub-Metric Values.
Attack Vector
Device Modification
Privileges Required
User Interaction
Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability Impact
Direct
Grnd Controller
Air-Gapped
None
Low
High
None
Low
High
None
Required
None
Low
High
0.85
0.62
0.55
0.2
0.77
0.44
0.85
0.62 (0.68 if Scope Changed)
0.27 (0.50 if Scope Changed)
0.85
0.62
0.56
0.22
0
Using the Base Score values of Table 17, the Base Score is then calculated using
Algorithm 1. The sub-metric variables were assigned in Section 3.2 within the defini-
tions of each sub-metric. As intermediaries, Impact Sub-Score (ISS) is calculated from
the Impact sub-metrics and Exploitability is calculated from four related sub-metrics.
Scope lastly is used as a modifier to both intermediaries using factors determined by
CVSS. These constants, along with the chosen values of each sub-metric, result in
a minimum 0.0 and maximum 10.0 value. The influence of each metric has been
balanced over time and testing by CVSS for their vulnerabilities and directly relate
to this framework’s risk metrics.
3.3.2 Temporal Score
The Temporal Score is calculated next after the Base Score using the three asso-
ciated sub-metrics. The Temporal Score is the new score for the device as the Base
Score of risk is potentially reduced by factors relating to time. Each sub-metric value
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Algorithm 1 Base Score Calculation
ISS = 1− [(1− C) ∗ (1− I) ∗ (1− A)]
if S = Unchanged then
Impact = 6.42 ∗ ISS
else
Impact = 7.52 ∗ (ISS − 0.29)− 3.25 ∗ (ISS − 0.02)15
end if
Exploitability = 8.22 ∗ AV ∗DM ∗ PR ∗ UI
if Impact <= 0 then
BaseScore = 0
else
if S = Unchanged then
BaseScore = Roundup(Min[Impact + Exploitability), 10])
else
BaseScore = Roundup(Min[1.08 ∗ (Impact + Exploitability), 10])
end if
end if
determined earlier is assigned a constant related to their associated risk value. As
seen in Table 18, the highest risk values correspond to a value of 1, which means that
the Base Score is not reduced in any manner due to factors of risk associated with
time. This highest value could be considered the default as it assumes the worst case
temporal state for each sub-metric and does not have an effect on the Base Score.
The Temporal sub-metric values are directly borrowed from CVSS and the connection
between temporal factors with vulnerability severity and risk have been shown.
Table 18. Temporal Sub-Metric Values.
Market
Vendor Support
Report Confidence
High
Medium
Low
None
Unavailable
Low
Medium
High
High
Normal
Low
1
0.97
0.94
0.91
1
0.97
0.96
0.95
1
0.96
0.92
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The calculation of the Temporal Score is shown in Algorithm 2. As each sub-
metric value is a percent of the risk that is still valid, simple multiplication of each
sub-metric with the original Base Score results in the new Temporal Score.
Algorithm 2 Temporal Score Equation.
TemporalScore = Roundup(BaseScore ∗M ∗ V S ∗ L)
3.3.3 Environmental Score
The Environmental Score uses the assessed sub-metrics in relation to requirements
of the device in its required or proposed mission sets. Constants are assigned to each
level as shown in Table 19. A Medium value could be understood as the default as the
constant assigned would have no effect on the Temporal Score for that sub-metric.
Table 19. Environmental Sub-metric Values.
Confidentiality Requirement &
Integrity Requirement &
Availability Requirement
High
Medium
Low
1.5
1.0
0.5
Progressing from the Temporal Score, the process to determine the Environmental
Score is shown in Algorithm 3. The two intermediaries, similar to the Base Score
algorithm, are Modified Impact Sub-Score (MISS), Modified Impact, and Modified
Exploitability. The “Modified” terminology is used to separate these terms from the
Base Score and do not use actual modified values like CVSS as explained earlier in
the chapter. The MISS is a modification of the ISS by varying the sub-metrics of
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability Impact by the associated Environmental
sub-metrics. Scope again is used as a modifier to the MISS as determined by CVSS.
Modified Exploitability is the same as Exploitability intermediary, but simply used in
separate equations. The Environmental Score is then calculated using the sub-metrics
of the Temporal Score and Base Metrics, with a maximum cap of 10.0 score.
53
Algorithm 3 Environment Modification Equations
//EnvironmentalScore ← {C,I,A Requirements , Modified Base Metrics}
MISS = Min{1− [(1− CR ∗ C) ∗ (1− IR ∗ I) ∗ (1− AR ∗ A)], 0.915}
if S = Unchanged then
ModifiedImpact = 6.42 ∗MISS
else
ModifiedImpact = 7.52 ∗ (MISS − 0.029)− 3.25 ∗ (MISS ∗ 0.9731− 0.02)13
end if
ModifiedExploitability = 8.22 ∗ AV ∗DM ∗ PR ∗ UI
if ModifiedImpact <= 0 then
EnvironmentalScore = 0
else
if S = Unchanged then
EnvironmentalScore = Roundup(Roundup[Min([ModifiedImpact +
ModifiedExploitability], 10)] ∗M ∗ V S ∗ L)
else
EnvironmentalScore = Roundup(Roundup[Min(1.08∗ModifiedImpact+
ModifiedExploitability), 10)] ∗ E ∗RL ∗RC)
end if
end if
3.3.4 Final Score
The final score used to define the overall cyber risk of the small UAV in regards
to the device, timing, and mission-environment is the Environmental score that was
described last in the previous section. This score will only range from 0.0 to 10.0,
though this is due to some amount of capping at either end. Rounding up to the
nearest tenth allows for ease of use and a significant number of possible values. Both
of these assertions will be analyzed in Chapter 4 through the use of case studies.
A new score would need to be calculated if any of the sub-metrics were to change,
which covers UAV model changes, configuration changes to applicable software or
hardware, changes over time, and changes to the mission set. By attempting to make
the qualitative sub-metrics as quick and easy as possible to assess, re-calculations for
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different potential acquisitions is expected. By calculating for each potential scenario,
the customer is able to make the most informed risk decision in selecting a new small
UAV.
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IV. Case Studies and Analysis
4.1 Case Study Build and Scoring
To demonstrate and analyze this risk assessment methodology, five models of
UAVs were evaluated across three major mission-environment scenarios plus one ad-
ditional as the worst case. By scoring across the total of 16 case studies, the ob-
jectives of breadth and variability, general applicability, and ease of use should be
made evident for the scoring system presented in the Chapter 3. To accomplish this,
each model was first defined with specifications relevant to the scoring system, then
each mission-environment was defined and scored based upon each model. Minor
changes to mission-environments were adjusted subsequently and scored under each
sub-section.
4.1.1 Small UAV Models
Model 1: The first model to be used in this case study is one of the highest
rated consumer UAVs currently on the market: the Chinese-made DJI Mavic 2 Pro.
The Mavic 2 Pro was released in mid-2018 and rivaled the best of its competitors for
“camera performance, video transmission, fight time, flight speed, less noise, omnidi-
rectional obstacle sensing, intelligent flight modes and its unique Hyperlapse feature”
[54]. The Mavic 2 Pro quad-rotor has a maximum flight time of 31 minutes, maxi-
mum speed of 45 mph, and hover at windspeeds up to 25 mph, all while being sold
for under $2,000 [54]. The Mavic 2 Pro is controlled via the DJI GO 4 app from a
user’s phone connected to a DJI controller, which sends commands and receives data
over Wi-Fi protocol standards and both frequencies by default [55]. The DJI brand
is well-known for their autopilot obstacle avoidance of which the Mavic 2 boasts 360
degree vision. The user is always in control of the UAV per FAA regulations, and the
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Mavic 2 Pro features multiple control failure protocols such as returning to a home
waypoint. DJI is known as a brand for their closed systems and protocols with the
data being encrypted with AES-256 standard [55]. DJI is plagued by rumors of sup-
ply chain vulnerabilities with DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA) placing the company on an industry alert [56]. While DJI has officially de-
nied all allegations to the U.S. Senate sub-committee on Security, some industries are
taking precautions with acquiring new UAVs from this manufacturer [56].
Model 2: The second model to be used for case studies in this paper is the well-
publicized U.S.-made Falcon 8+, of which the Shooting Star version is most known
for its light displays at Disney Parks [57]. The Intel-produced Falcon 8+ model
was released in 2015 and is meant for missions of mapping structures and terrain
[57]. The Falcon 8+ is an octo-rotor design and boasts a maximum flight time of 26
minutes, maximum speed of 22 mph, and hover at windspeeds up to 27 mph [57].
Engineered specifically for Intel’s waiver with the FAA to allow the Intel Cockpit to
operate upwards of 1,500 UAVs at one time, the individual price tag of $30,000 is a
bit misleading since they are contracted by mission and not purchased one-off [58].
The Falcon 8+ is controlled exclusively through the single Intel ground controller
Cockpit, sending commands and receiving data through both Wi-Fi frequencies with
manual control of a single device possible for emergencies [57]. The Falcon 8+ runs
an open-source Linux OS, uses Wi-Fi encryption for data transmission, but does not
use encryption for data at rest [57]. While operating multiple UAVs, all mission data
is processed at Intel data centers since missions have reportedly generated over 18TB
of data [58].
Model 3: The third model is the French-made Parrot Anafi, which represents the
cheaper yet capable UAV models for comparison. Produced by Parrot who is known
for the under $1,000 market, the Anafi ($600 currently in the U.S.) represents the
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professional tier for Parrot while still being accessible by hobbyists. The Anafi is a
quad-rotor model advertising 25 minutes of flight time, 33 mph maximum horizontal
speed, and hover control up to 31 mph without wind [59]. Parrot utilizes a unique
controller that the user’s smartphone attaches into for navigation and the standard
software build requires full control during missions with a few pre-programmable fail-
safe controls [59]. The controller utilizes both Wi-Fi frequency standards for control
and data, and features no security for data at rest or over the air. The smartphone app
is the ground controller and, while usually connected to Parrot servers, can operate
away from network [59].
Model 4: The fourth small UAV model is the Insitu ScanEagle 3, which rep-
resents a non-copter design (pusher motor) yet fits the requirements for these small
UAV case study scenarios. This Boeing-owned sUAV is not International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) listed like its previous version ScanEagle 2 due to an un-
known amount of change in design under “Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) specially
designed to incorporate a defense article” [60]. ITAR listing represents additional reg-
ulations placed by the U.S. to better control the sale of arms to friends and potential
adversaries. None of these regulations specifically reduce cyber risk directly, though
U.S. manufacturing and design may influence customer trust in the product [61]. The
ScanEagle 3 is utilized here as a similar-to-ITARs small UAV and is common within
the inventories of many nations’ militaries, specifically coastal forces [60]. This vehicle
is rated up to 20 hours flight endurance, 92 mph maximum speed, and recovery with
crosswinds of up to 18 mph, all of this on top of a max payload weight of 20 lbs [60].
The ScanEagle 3 has the price tag to match at around $3.2 million for four vehicles and
the related infrastructure to launch and recover [62]. The ScanEagle 3 contains the
Athena 111m autopilot that is normally seen on larger runway restricted UAVs [63]
and is capable of handling the pneumatic launching process [64]. The ground station
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of the ScanEagle 3 is the Insitu’s Common Open Mission Management Command and
Control (ICOMC2) which is an open-architecture application with numerous plug-ins
that can be loaded to nearly any laptop for control of multiple aerial vehicles while
remote from online connection [65]. The ICOMC2 controller has significant fail-safe
measures including real-time operational risk tracking amongst multiple aircraft and
uses Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS) SAE AS-4 messaging proto-
col to provide additional availability and security over-the-air [65]. Made specifically
for sensitive information collection, the ScanEagle 3 implements encryption both for
data stored locally as well as control authorization [65].
Model 5: The fifth and last model used in this selection of case studies is a DIY
small UAV utilizing the open-source software, closed-source hardware of a Pixhawk 4
autopilot from U.S. Holybro [66]. With a low capital threshold, DIY sUAV frames can
be built from kits or even 3D printed, then mount the autopilot, sensors, controls, and
power source. Due to the wide variations possible, the model used in this case study
is theoretical except for the security features that apply to the risk assessment. This
model will utilize a radio frequency standalone remote controller that directly controls
the model. The Pixhawk 4 autopilot features pre-programmed fail-safe protocols
that allow the aircraft to return to mission start coordinates [66]. All changes to
configurations are done over the USB port via cable, from an air-gapped laptop that
utilizes the ArduCopter software. This sUAV has additional software written to
encrypt all stored data on board and password protected to stop unauthorized re-
programming. Due to the home-made frame and ease of upgrading components, the
life expectancy of this sUAV is less than the average sUAV.
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4.1.2 Mission-Environment Scenarios
The three scenarios presented next represent a swath of the missions and environ-
ments that small UAVs may be found operating today. These scenarios are built to
give the information required to complete the risk assessment while demonstrating
the breadth of missions and environments that the assessment can cover. The last
scenario, number four, is a worst case scenario where only the highest risk values
for each sub-metric as chosen, which is used to show boundary conditions of this
assessment methodology.
Mission 1: As the simplest of mission scenarios, an individual user purchases a
single UAV for their agricultural business to monitor crops and livestock. Since video
streaming is the only mission, the device bought will only be used in a standard out-
of-the-box configuration. The terrain is almost completely flat with no buildings or
very few trees within the operating area. The user plans to operate the UAV manually
only to fly first-person video capture with no data storage. The user plans to utilize
the aircraft for only a single season to test out its effectiveness. As an independent
farmer, the user does not consider data captured to be confidential or sensitive. With
full access to the area and a low operating ceiling, manual recovery after losing signal
is easy. The user plans to utilize a tablet as the ground controller without access to
the Internet while operating.
The sub-metrics shown in Table 20 show lowest risk in user mission requirements
(Environmental) and standard device risk values across Base sub-metrics. Since the
user in Scenario 1 does not have concerns for supply chain risk, the manufacturer
is not a factor across Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability Impact sub-metrics.
The scores shown in Table 21 clearly separate the third model, the Anafi, from the
rest for the lack of any security features, though it is the cheapest option for the
mission. The rest of the final scores are close, with the first and fourth model having
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the same lowest risk score. The sub-metrics for these two models is different only by
the swapping the C and A sub-metric values.
Table 20. Mission-Environment 1 Sub-metric Values.
Base Temporal Environmental
AV DM PR UI C I A M VS L CR IR AR
Mavic 0.55 0.77 0.27 0.62 0 0.22 0.22 1 0.95 0.92 0.5 0.5 0.5
Falcon 8+ 0.55 0.77 0.62 0.62 0 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.5 0.5 0.5
Anafi 0.55 0.77 0.62 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.5 0.5 0.5
ScanEagle 0.55 0.77 0.27 0.62 0.22 0.22 0 1 0.95 0.92 0.5 0.5 0.5
Pixhawk 0.55 0.44 0.27 0.62 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.5 0.5 0.5
Table 21. Mission-Environment 1 Scoring.
Base Score Temporal Score Final Score
Mavic 3.1 2.8 1.7
Falcon 8+ 3.9 3.4 2.3
Anafi 7.3 6.4 4.7
ScanEagle 3.1 2.8 1.7
Pixhawk 3.8 3.3 2.0
Mission 2: The user organization is purchasing a fleet of UAVs for their delivery
and distribution business. The devices will require modification in-house to allow
the carrying and releasing of small packages. To meet regulations, each UAV will be
controlled by individual ground controllers and the devices will not be networked to
each other. The delivery area is a 10 minute radius around the distribution center or
mobile host ground vehicle and the area is defined as a suburban home community
with no nearby airports. The organization plans on utilizing these aircraft for three
years, at which point they plan to purchase a new fleet. The flight data stored on
each device is considered sensitive to the company due to research plans to expedite
deliveries. The delivery area has many civilians and homes, so uncontrolled landings
are highly dangerous. The ground controllers are computers that are networked
directly to the Internet for data processing off-site.
Mission 2 sub-metrics are shown in Table 22 and reflect the increasing risk and
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concern from the owning organization compared to Scenario 1. The Base sub-metrics
differ first by the modification required to complete the mission and also by the or-
ganization’s growing concern over the Chinese influence on the first model’s supply
chain, specifically to Confidentiality Impact, but not Availability since the organiza-
tion does not plan for global use of this fleet. The Temporal sub-metrics again show
the same Market and Vendor Support values seen in Scenario 1; however, the Lifespan
value reflects the longer planned usage, though the fifth model (the DIY model) is
known to be unable to fulfill the specified lifetime and would require earlier replace-
ment. The final scores are shown in Table 23 with nearly all of the models reflecting
the higher risk pairing any model to the mission and environment. The small increase
with the first model, the DJI Mavic Pro 2, under the C sub-metric clearly removes the
UAV from the lowest risk category that it was in for the previous scenario due to the
increase in supply chain risk per the priorities of the commercial organization. Across
all models due to the mission parameters, sub-metrics of Access Vectors, Lifespan,
and Confidentiality / Integrity / Availability Requirements were all increased in risk
tier. Device Modification was decreased for all but the DIY Pixhawk 4 in risk tier.
Table 22. Mission-Environment 2 Sub-metric Values.
Base Temporal Environmental
AV DM PR UI C I A M VS L CR IR AR
Mavic 0.62 0.44 0.27 0.62 0.22 0.22 0.22 1 0.95 1 1.5 1 1.5
Falcon 8+ 0.62 0.44 0.62 0.62 0 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.95 1 1.5 1 1.5
Anafi 0.62 0.44 0.62 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.97 0.97 1 1.5 1 1.5
ScanEagle 0.62 0.44 0.27 0.62 0.22 0.22 0 1 0.95 1 1.5 1 1.5
Pixhawk 0.55 0.44 0.27 0.62 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.97 0.92 1.5 1 1.5
Mission 3: This mission scenario is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
military organization purchasing a fleet of UAVs to map and track potential enemy
positions. The UAVs require a separately procured camera-sensor suite, though the
software will remain standard. The fleet will be pre-programmed with mission data
62
Table 23. Mission-Environment 2 Scoring.
Base Score Temporal Score Final Score
Mavic 3.8 3.7 4.4
Falcon 8+ 3.4 3.2 3.7
Anafi 6.8 6.4 6.4
ScanEagle 2.9 2.8 3.3
Pixhawk 3.8 3.3 3.9
from a stand-alone ground controller and only interface with mission-partnered UAVs
as a swarm, meaning the scope will change if one is compromised. The military or-
ganization plans a life cycle of two years for the fleet before replacing aircraft. Since
all data captured is stored on the device until mission is complete, all mission data
is extremely sensitive.
Mission 3 sub-metrics are shown in Table 24 and reflect the first of the scenarios
where the Scope is Changed, meaning higher values for Privileges Required and differ-
ent algorithm equations which results in overall higher risk scores. Additionally, the
Chinese DJI model has significantly higher risk impact compared to the first scenario
since a military organization other than China would be wary of its supply chain. The
other manufacturers were not similarly adjusted, which would be reasonable to any
NATO member. The Availability Requirement is set to the lowest risk value due to
the open terrain and pre-programmed mission parameters, even though the mission
is high-risk and the user is not immediately in the control loop. The final scores are
shown in Table 25 with the second and fourth models (Intel and Insitu, respectively)
vying for lowest scores. Due to the higher priority to the supply chain risk, the DJI
model now has the same overall high risk score as the low security Anafi.
Worst Case: As the edge case to test the robustness of the scoring system, the
worst case scenario sets each of the sub-metrics to the highest risk tier and numerical
value. The sUAV here has direct logical connection to the Internet, has no modi-
fications, no privileges required for access, is connected to other devices for attack,
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Table 24. Mission-Environment 3 Sub-metric Values.
Base Temporal Environmental
AV DM PR UI C I A M VS L CR IR AR
Mavic 0.2 0.44 0.5 0.85 0.56 0.22 0.56 1 0.95 0.96 1.5 1.5 0.5
Falcon 8+ 0.2 0.44 0.68 0.85 0 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.95 0.96 1.5 1.5 0.5
Anafi 0.2 0.44 0.68 0.85 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.5 1.5 0.5
ScanEagle 0.2 0.44 0.5 0.85 0.22 0.22 0 1 0.95 0.96 1.5 1.5 0.5
Pixhawk 0.2 0.44 0.5 0.85 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.97 0.92 1.5 1.5 0.5
Table 25. Mission-Environment 3 Scoring.
Base Score Temporal Score Final Score
Mavic 6.8 6.3 6.4
Falcon 8+ 3.4 3.1 4.2
Anafi 7.0 6.4 6.4
ScanEagle 3.3 3.1 4.2
Pixhawk 6.1 5.3 4.9
and does not have a user in the loop. The sUAV has no confidentiality, integrity, or
availability securities in place to temper the impact of a compromise. To be scored
highest within the Temporal sub-metrics, the device is very common on the market,
yet has no vendor or community support. For whatever mission this device should
be used for, the device is expected to be in use in the current configuration for a long
period of time (more than 2 years). Lastly to set the Environmental sub-metrics,
the device’s mission has a high confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirement.
The values associated with such scoring are shown in Table 26 and the final scores
are shown in Table 27. To be expressed at length in Section 4.2.2, the scores shown
in Table 27 are capped by the CVSS algorithm at 10.0 and not naturally achieved.
Table 26. Worst Case Sub-metric Values.
Base Temporal Environmental
AV DM PR UI C I A M VS L CR IR AR
Worst Case 0.85 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.56 0.56 0.56 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5
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Table 27. Worst Case Scoring.
Base Score Temporal Score Final Score
Worst Case 10.0 10.0 10.0
4.2 Analysis
Below we discuss the presented implementation’s benefits and challenges. The
risk assessment tool is rated against the three objectives of Breadth and Variability,
General Applicability, and Ease of Use. These are suggested by related research in
cybersecurity risk assessments [50, 53]. The scope of this paper does not analyze the
assessment against any live situations or historical information, which may provide
additional and different insights for adjustments.
4.2.1 Benefits
The first observation of the case studies is the spread of scores based on the limited
number of examples. Even with just 16 total example scenarios including the worst
case, the scores cover 83% of the possible scores. A best case scenario was specifically
excluded as one of the examples as it presents trivial information that can easily be
achieved. A UAV with high securities within Confidentiality, Integrity, and Avail-
ability Impact sub-metrics will force the overall Base, Temporal, and Environmental
Scores to 0.0 without variations. The objective of reaching breadth of the scoring
range to allow for maximum variations of risk scores is therefore achieved. Across the
three scenarios where risk to the buyer was increasing, the scores for almost all models
increased as well. Additionally, between models, the DJI, Intel, and Insitu’s models
provided more security than the Parrot, which is factored into the cost of the UAV,
and their scores were noticeably lower for the majority of missions. One exception to
this was in Scenario 3 where the DJI’s rumored supply chain risk is heavily factored
for a non-Chinese military organization and that risk is shown by scores close to the
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unsecured Anafi. Scenario 2 had a purchasing organization only slightly influenced
by this possible risk, and the Mavic 2 Pro showed significantly better final scores
compared to the Anafi. The objective of the risk assessment showing variability and
general risk correlation is therefore achieved.
For General Applicability, the tool was successfully able to apply to all of the
models and scenarios. This is in sharp contrast to the direct CVSS sub-metrics
which has several that do not apply based on the scope of component versus system
level view and assuming traditional network setup. The models included a pusher
motor fixed wing sUAV with the ScanEagle 3, showing how the assessment is able
to account for different designs. Many physical design features of aircraft may not
affect the cyber risk; however, there are some correlations, such as with the additional
weight allowable for a higher end autopilot.
The last proposed objective, Ease of Use, is a more subjective characteristic, but
it is determined to be achieved in this risk assessment based on the required docu-
mentation to complete the scores in the case studies. For all five models presented, all
of the sub-metrics were determined from the specification documentation that is pub-
lished online and from other easily accessible advertisements. This means that nearly
anyone, with the risk assessment’s guide, could determine their organization’s or their
personal scores with some amount of accuracy. There is no in-depth cyber forensics
or testing utilized for any of the sub-metrics, though research into vulnerabilities can
still be taken into account, as seen with the supply chain risk of DJI.
4.2.2 Drawbacks & Challenges
The spread of scores is seen to be limited by CVSS’s built-in caps to make sure
that the scores do not go above 10.0, which it may in the worst case. Running the
algorithm for the worst case found that a number of possible high ranged risk values
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are lost, such as those to 10.8 for Base Score (if Scope Unchanged, then no values
lost) and those to 10.9 on the Final Environmental Score. These caps result in lost
variability between scores at the top end of the risk spectrum by setting them equal
at the maximum 10.0 score. CVSS accepts this loss with the assumption that any risk
framework utilizing their assessment will make strides to reduce and cover this glaring
vulnerability to the network [4]. Working with system risk here, the same assumption
can be made for this risk assessment that few systems will actually achieve an above
maximum score and the users will put more effort to lower that score through security
features or by choosing another available model so the maximum score will not persist
long term.
Another drawback of this risk assessment through the case studies is the actual
level of usability by potential users. By focusing on the acquisition phase, the level of
cybersecurity knowledge is expected to be low, but the translation done by the assess-
ment of cyber principles is expected to bridge that gap. To fully verify this objective,
it may require human studies or live production level results, which are outside the
scope of this paper. The analysis of documentation required for accessibility and
legibility shows promise, but does not prove the objective.
4.2.3 Simulation Objectives
In light of the development and analysis of this cyber risk assessment, consid-
eration is required for a next stage in development. One such avenue of interest is
hardware-in-the-loop simulation. Simulations have been used for decades to allow for
low cost testing in a sandbox environment to test the boundaries and flaws of software
and hardware by inputting all controls and variables. Specifically with cyber-physical
machines, providing as much of the hardware without significantly raising the cost of
testing can allow for more accurate testing by using the real parts and illuminate pre-
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viously unknown relations or interactions between the cyber and physical domains.
Hardware-in-the-loop simulations have seen a surge in use within the SCADA and
critical infrastructure domains where sensors and actuators have a higher ratio of the
components in a system.
Based on this research, one of the main objectives of this style of simulation is
to verify the configuration and protocols utilized by a small UAV. The cyber risk
assessment proposed here makes the underlying assumption that the publicized spec-
ifications are accurate. While further research with this assessment can determine
with historical data how accurate this assumption has been, new models would re-
quire operational testing to validate. Operational usage was one of the key avoidance
goals within this assessment as it does not allow for pushing forward the cyber risk
calculation into the life-cycle of the vehicle. By creating a hardware-in-the-loop simu-
lation, this testing could be achieved much earlier in the cycle and provide confidence
in the risk assessment’s score and confidence to an organization of their overall mis-
sion’s risk.
Other objectives for small UAV testing based on this research is to test unique
configurations and protocols that are not utilized outside of the UAV domain. Small
UAVs commonly use similar protocols, such as Wi-Fi and even to some extent the
OSs, which come with more oversight from many research communities and interested
parties. The more unique characteristics that should be tested for within a hardware-
in-the-loop simulation for small UAVs are geo-fencing, cyber-physical fail-safes, and
signal input / output. An unseen vulnerability of mobile devices including phones
and UAVs is software that is triggered by GPS location data that changes the ex-
pected interactions with the device [67]. Within simulations, GPS spoofing is nearly a
requirement and geo-fencing may be able to be discovered with fuzzing. This testing
is of particular interest to organizations or nation-states where the supply chain is
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less trustworthy and the device is expected to move through contested locations. For
cyber-physical fail-safes, the hardware to software interactions for the boundaries of
expected flight require additional testing that can not be determined within a soft-
ware only simulation. While manufacturers tend to advertise featured fail-safes such
as “Return Home” and “Controlled Descent” that are used in this risk assessment,
the physical interactions with cyber components present some unknown results when
outside the expected input. By adding in hardware to the simulation, these software
fail-safes can be tested away from operational hazards. Lastly, closed-system signal
analysis may provide an avenue to quantitative risk assessment and provide insight to
vulnerabilities such as “Call Home” features. Since attackers require some access to
a device to compromise a system, the signals to and from a UAV may provide some
measure of the device’s risk to hacking. While these measurements would give direct
numerical information on the system that could be used for a quantitative scoring,
the exact correlations to risk and how to measure risk outside of signals is currently
unknown. “Call Home” features installed by manufacturers or attackers could be
tested through simulation, though triggering these messages may be difficult, espe-
cially if the OS knows that it is in a simulation. Hardware-in-the-loop may provide
that extra stimulus to trick the software in to sending out information that could be
collected and tracked during simulation.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Summary
This chapter summarizes the work performed for this research including the design
and development of the new cyber risk assessment for small UAVs. Each objective
introduced in Section 1.3 is restated before a summary of how this research success-
fully reached that objective. Lastly, recommendations and lessons learned for future
work with the risk assessment and other cyber security topics with small UAVs are
discussed.
5.2 Research Contributions
Assess whether any cyber or physical risk assessments of similar do-
mains accurately quantify the cyber risk of small UAVs. This research is
focused on the assessment of the cyber security state of a small UAV through the
use of a tool to quantify the risk. No official or formal cyber risk assessments for
small UAVs were discovered in this research, though some proposals have been made
in academia [53]. Since Hartmann and Steup’s research failed to reach their own
objectives [11], risk assessments in related domains were also analyzed for viability to
adaptation to small UAVs. While URAF provided operational risk assessment and
CVSS scored cyber vulnerability severity, no individual assessment analyzed could be
directly utilized to score cyber risk.
Define a new small UAV cyber risk assessment tool (if none exists). Due
to the success and close proximity of FIRST’s CVSS tool, their model was used as
the foundation of the new proposed cyber risk assessment. Using qualitative security
questions that could be determined without operational testing and expert knowledge
of individual vehicles, the new assessment determined 14 sub-metrics and calculated
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a final score for the UAV specific to the planned operational mission and environ-
ment. By scoring all scenarios from 0.0 to 10.0, the final score allowed for ease of
interpretation of the score in relation to similar vehicles or changes in the vehicle’s
configuration or other variables.
Determine the objectives of success a small UAV cyber risk assessment
should meet, based on similar domain assessments. By the fact that a cyber
risk score could be calculated from the publicly released specifications and desired
mission requirements, the ease-of-use objective was met by this tool without use of a
device specific expert. The ease-of-use objective allows for the cyber risk assessment
to be used as early as possible in the life-cycle of the vehicle and would allow a
customer’s risk framework to make informed decisions about acquisitions of a new
vehicle or fleet.
The granularity of the risk assessment tool was analyzed by the characteristics of
its breadth and variability through the case studies. While the algorithms and possible
numerical values of the tool do require capping at both extremes, the amount of lost
potential scores was found to be insignificant, especially in light of the meaning of
such scores to any risk framework. The rounding up to the nearest tenth of each score
and the final score was demonstrated to provide significant numbers of unique scores
across all case studies and almost all unique scores per scenario. This variability allows
for informed comparison between similar vehicles for the same mission-environment
scenario or any other change in variable.
Through all of the case studies, the cyber risk assessment met general applicability
to all models and scenarios. Small yet significant security changes to the case studies
resulted in some related change in the resulting risk score. Qualitatively, the tool
captures the unique configurations and uses of small UAVs across infrastructures and
industries which increases the tool’s viability to nearly any UAV customer. These
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models were analyzed with several mission-environment scenarios that provided the
rest of the required variables to calculate the risk scores. These scenarios meet the
objective missed by Hartmann and Steup that any cyber risk assessment of UAVs
must include the terrain and mission set of the vehicle [11].
Stine’s cyber risk assessment objectives were all found to be useful and good
measure of the tool [50]. While slightly adapted for usability by non-cybersecurity
professionals, Stine’s Ease-of-Use, Low Cost, and Easily Understood Results were
utilized successfully in this research named as Ease of Use, General Applicability,
and Breadth and Variability, respectively. Stine’s healthcare focus was not entirely
dissimilar to small UAVs due the embedded nature of its electronics, breadth of
devices / modifications, and the trusted yet mobile nature of the scored devices. In
comparison, Hartmann and Steup provide no objectives of measure for their scheme,
though they discussed important details to be included in a UAV cyber risk assessment
[53].
Establish the objectives a hardware-in-the-loop simulation of a small
UAV should meet to best bring to light potential vulnerabilities. The
overall objective for a simulation of a small UAV being tested for cyber insecurities
is to verify that configurations and protocols meet manufacturer specifications. This
objective is important in light of trust issues in the supply chain related to nation-
state tensions between the number one small UAV manufacturer, the Chinese DJI,
and the rest of the world. With specifications verified, only device specific protocols
would need to be further researched through simulation for vulnerability due to the
wide research of vulnerabilities on common configurations and protocols, such as Wi-
Fi or the OS. Other objectives to verify through simulation include the following:
GPS spoofing to actively fuzz the OS for fencing, physical maneuvering for cyber
fail-safe protocols, and signal input / output for verification of signal generation in
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light of “phone home” code.
5.3 Future Work
Given the importance of the work presented and continuous technology develop-
ments in small UAV cyber security and risk assessment, there are many areas that
could be further explored, matured, or developed. Listed below are topics of interest
that would expand the scope of this research:
• Ease of Use Study: The analysis presented in this research on ease of use
of the tool is based on the availability of required specifications and requires
data points into the human factor. A study into the knowledge standard of
acquisition personnel of small UAVs would provide basis and conducting trials
of these members using the tool with analysis of accuracy to risk would provide
support to the claim of ease of use.
• Expansion of Data: This research presented five different models with a
significant range of features and cost that may be weighed in consideration by a
customer. Since the UAV market has many more options even within the single
manufacturer DJI, future research would need to include more models to verify
the uniqueness of risk scores to aid risk framework decision points.
• Feedback of Data: The true measure of validity for a cyber risk framework
is its ability to predict attacks over time, in the face of prior historical data
being a poor indicator of future cyber events [38]. The CVSS algorithms have
been updated over time for IT systems based on seen changes for a shorter
term prediction of severity [4]. To build resiliency similarly to CVSS, this tool
calculates risk based on security principles that evolve at a slower pace but
are correlated to fewer attacks [4]. Future work will be required to update the
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weighting of sub-metrics and numerical values to continue to best calculate risk.
• Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation: One avenue of extension to this re-
search would be to create a simulation of current small UAV models to run
against mission sets to evaluate the specifications to the risk. Due to the cyber-
physical characteristics of UAVs, hardware would be required in the loop to best
simulate the responses to stimulus. The first advantage to doing this simulation
would be to verify the risks to certain specifications within this research other
than through logic or operational testing. The second advantage would be to
validate manufacturer specifications of hardware and software to their publi-
cized specifications, especially when supply chain trust has been compromised.
• Fully Quantitative Assessment: The risk assessment proposed in this re-
search places numerical values to qualitative characteristics, which naturally
introduces variations based on perceived value. A quantitative measure of UAV
characteristics would remove this bias and variation, though the exact character-
istics to measure is still unknown. One method proposed and showing promise
is through the collection of input / output signals to the system through which
an attacker in limited. This method assumes a safe state prior to use, no inclu-
sion of the ground controller and other connected vehicles to the closed system,
and nearly none of the operational factors of importance to the URAF.
5.4 Final Words
This work demonstrated a viable new process to calculate the cyber risk of a
small UAV. The cyber security of these airframes will need to continue to increase in
proportion with the fielding of new fleets across military, commercial, and individual
inventories. There has been found to be a gap in the current state of cyber security for
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these devices, though cyber risk frameworks have been implemented amongst nearly
all organizations today. The operational risk is covered well by the FAA’s URAF,
though cyber risks and the unique characteristics of small UAVs are excluded. Built
from the well-respected CVSS model, this proposed new assessment will require tun-
ing to better score risk and recognition by major organizations to hold any signif-
icance to individuals. Improvements to operational fleets’ security will be realized
when operational and cyber threats are accurately recognized and weighed. Since the
manufacturers of small UAVs have not responded to this need, consumers must take
appropriate actions including assessing the risk of their own fleets to protect their
most valuable assets.
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